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INTRODUCTION
In late 2000, the United Nations General Assembly voted on
a resolution titled "Prevention of an Arms Race in Outer
Space."' The measure passed with 163 Yeas, zero Nays, and
three abstentions.2 The United States abstained along with its
allies Israel and the Federated States of Micronesia.3  In
January 2001, a commission assessing United Sates national
security in space headed by then Defense Secretary Donald
Rumsfeld reported that the United States should "ensure that
the President will have the option to deploy weapons in space."4
The Rumsfeld Commission warned that the United States was
vulnerable to a "Space Pearl Harbor."5 In June 2002, the United
States officially withdrew from the thirty-year-old Anti-Ballistic
. J.D./M.B.A. Candidate 2010, University of Minnesota Law School and Carlson
School of Management.
1. G.A. Res. 55/558, 7, U.N. Doc. AIRES/551558 (Nov. 20, 2000).
2. Press Release, Gen. Assembly, General Assembly Adopts 49 Disarmament,
International Security Texts on Recommendation of its First Committee, U.N. Doc.
GA/9829, (Nov. 20, 2000).
3. Id.
4. Report of The Commission to Assess United States National Security Space
Management and Organization xii (2001) [hereinafter Rumsfeld Commission].
5. Id. at vii, xiii, xv.
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Missile Treaty,6 leaving the Outer Space Treaty as the "primary
legal bar on space weaponization."7 In August 2006 the United
States announced a new space policy which reaffirmed its
dedication to the peaceful uses of space, but also stated a policy
initiative of denying the use of space to adversaries if
necessary! By December 2006, when the United Nations
General Assembly voted on the "Transparency and Confidence-
Building Measures in Outer Space Activities" resolution,9 the
United States was the lone dissenter." Finally, in January
2007, China successfully launched a missile from earth to
destroy an obsolete Chinese satellite, sending a clear message of
its ability to destroy objects in orbit." The United States
submitted a formal complaint; the United Nations took no
action in response. 2
The possibility of space becoming another forum for warfare
has long been a fear of the international community." Although
many treaties have addressed weapons in space, 4 space actors
have been testing the limits of these treaties more and more
6. The United States officially withdrew from the ABM Treaty on June 13,
2002. See Press Release, The White House, Office of the Press Sec'y, Statement by
the President (June 13, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/06/
20020613-9.html; see generally Treaty on the Limitations of Anti-Ballistic Missile
Systems, art. V, U.S.-U.S.S.R., May 26, 1972, 23 U.S.T. 3435 (prohibiting
developing, testing, or deploying ABM systems in outer space).
7. Andrew T. Park, Incremental Steps for Achieving Space Security: The Need
for a New Way of Thinking to Enhance the Legal Regime for Space, 28 HOus. J. INT'L
L. 871, 874 (2006). See The Treaty on Principles Governing the Activities of States
in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other Celestial
Bodies, Jan. 27, 1967, 18 U.S.T. 2410, 610 U.N.T.S. 205 [hereinafter Outer Space
Treaty]. The Outer Space Treaty prohibits the placement of weapons of mass
destruction in outer space by any means. Id.
8. United States National Space Policy, Aug. 31, 2006, http://ostp.gov (click on
"White House News" drop down and select "US National Space Policy") (last visited
Feb. 18, 2008) [hereinafter 2006 Space Policy].
9. G.A. Res. A61/PV.67, U.N. Doc. AI61fPV.67 (Dec. 6, 2006).
10. The resolution was approved by a vote of 175 in favor to one against
(United States), with no abstentions. Press Release, Gen. Assembly, Arms Trade
Treaty, 'Nuclear-Weapon-Free World,' Outer Space Arms Race Among Issues, as
General Assembly Adopts 54 First Committee Texts, U.N. Doc GA/10547 (Dec. 6,
2006).
11. Joseph Kahn, A New Player at Star Wars: China Shows Assertiveness In
Reported Weapons Test, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 20, 2007, at A7. It should be noted that
the United States and the Soviet Union both successfully destroyed satellites in
orbit with terrestrial launched missiles in the 1980s. Id.
12. David E. Sanger & Joseph Kahn, U.S. Tries to Interpret China's Silence
Over Test, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2007, at A7.
13. See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, 4.
14. Id. at art. IV.
THE WEAPONIZATION OF SPACE
frequently. The United States has stated that space warfare is
inevitable. 5 This possibility is especially troubling because the
global economy depends heavily on outer space. National
defense, global communications, an ever growing commercial
space industry, international flights, and the internet all depend
on satellites orbiting in outer space.'7 These satellites make
obvious first targets for any space arms race.8 The Outer Space
Treaty is the last defense against weaponization of space,
making it one of the most crucial treaties at this time. 9 In light
of its importance, the Outer Space Treaty deserves a critical
review. Part I of this Note discusses the evolution of the current
body of space law, Part II argues that the current body of space
law is inadequate, and Part III presents principles necessary in
any international instrument on space law that hopes to
successfully delay the introduction of weapons to space.
I. THE ORIGINS OF SPACE LAW
There is no codified compilation of international space law."
A legal regime has arisen primarily from the Outer Space
Treaty, subsequent supplementary treaties, and international
law.E' Much of international space law is the result of the Cold
War and fears of being left behind in the space race.2 While
space law continues to evolve, the ethos upon which space law
15. Karl Grossman, The Phantom Menace, EXTRA!, May/June 1999, available at
http://www.fair.org (in search box enter "Phantom Menace" to access article).
16. In 2004 commercial space industries had a cumulative economic impact of
more than $98 billion in the United States alone. OFFICE OF COMMERCIAL SPACE
TRANSP., FED. AVIATION ADMIN., ECONOMIC IMPACT OF COMMERCIAL SPACE
TRANSPORTATION ON THE U.S. ECONOMY: 2004, at 9 (2004). This figure does not
include the economic impact made possible by global communications or
advancements resulting from space exploration.
17. See Rumsfeld Commission, supra, note 4, at viii (discussing the dependence
of the United States on space and the need to protect those vulnerabilities).
18. Id.
19. See Park, supra note 7, at 874.
20. See Ty S. Twibell, Space Law: Legal Restraints on Commercialization and
Development of Outer Space, 65 UMKC L. REV. 589, 592 (1997) (noting that space
law is generally derived from international law, multi-lateral treaties, and
international agreements). Within the United States, space law is heavily regulated
by numerous governmental agencies and statutes. See id. at 605-06 (discussing the
role of government agencies in regulating domestic space law).
21. Id. The treaties and international law from which space law is derived is
discussed more fully infra in Parts I.B-C.
22. See Twibell, supra note 20, at 591-92 (noting that the U.S./Soviet Union
power struggle had enormous implications on the initial structure of space law).
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was constructed may prove to be an albatross that slows its
advance, destroying the very ideals it purports to uphold.
Understanding where space law comes from is crucial to
understanding why it will fail and how it can be strengthened.23
This section explores the fears that led to the current body of
space law, the treaties that comprise the law, the historical
antecedents drawn upon, and the ways that the law is affecting
space actors today.
A. THE FEARFUL START TO SPACE LAW
In 1957 the Soviets launched Sputnik and rocketed into the
Space Age.24 The phrase "the Space Age" was coined by United
States politicians and reporters who recognized that entry into
space began an entirely new era for international politics.
25
Within a year, the United States Congress had passed the
National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 which created
NASA and signaled the start of the space race.26 The United
Nations, also realizing the importance of space, quickly
established an ad hoc political body to govern the nascent realm
of space.27 The United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Use
of Outer Space (COPUOS) has since grown into one of the
largest United Nations committees.28
The tension of the Cold War was not lost on the United
States, the Soviet Union, or the world at large. 9 Both the
United States and the Soviet Union, the only two space actors at
the time, feared the other's entry to space would allow for a
decisive advantage in the Cold War." This fear was balanced,
however, against the fear that non-space actors would align
themselves against the nation first to enter space.3' In addition,
the rest of the world bore legitimate fears that the two space
actors would lay claims upon the entire solar system, leaving
23. See Park, supra note 7, at 875.
24. Id. at 875-76.
25. NATHAN C. GOLDMAN, AMERICAN SPACE LAW 4 (Iowa State Univ. Press)
(1988).
26. The National Aeronautics and Space Act, Pub. L. No. 85-568, 72 Stat. 426,
438 (1958).
27. Park, supra note 7, at 876.
28. United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs Home Page,
http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/COPUOS/copuos.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2008).
29. Glenn Harlan Reynolds, International Space Law: Into the Twenty-First
Century, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 225, 229-30 (1992).
30. Id.
31. Id.
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them forever behind.32 Over the next two decades, four major
space treaties would be signed and ratified under these Cold
War fears.3
Recognizing the importance of international solidarity,
COPUOS sought to approve all treaties by complete consensus.,'
Although the general rules of COPUOS only require a simple
majority to pass resolutions, COPUOS decided to allow nations
to submit "on-the-record" interpretations of provisions prior to
agreeing to them to encourage consensus.35 Frequently, the on-
the-record interpretations were at odds with the interpretation
of other nations.36 Over the years these diverse interpretations
have caused the Outer Space Treaty to be interpreted in widely
different ways. 7 As the number of nations who were party to
COPUOS grew, consensus became more and more challenging
to achieve.38 Hence, more resolutions have been passed by a
simple majority, and the lack of consensus-the standard
COPUOS once sought-has contributed to the degrading of
COPUOS in the international community.39 The prevailing body
of space law was formed from these hurried and forced
conditions.
B. THE TREATIES OF SPACE LAW
The Outer Space Treaty is the foundation of space law.4" It
has been signed by ninety-one nations and is not disputed.'
The remaining three treaties that comprise space law built upon
the Outer Space Treaty's principles to provide more substantive
guidelines and rules. 2 A fifth treaty, the Moon Treaty, has been
widely rejected.43 Collectively, the acceptance and rejection of
32. Id.
33. For a more detailed examination of these treaties see infra Parts I.B.1-2.
Note that because the Moon Treaty never acquired wide acceptance it is typically
not considered amongst the major space treaties. Twibell, supra note 20, at 598.
34. GOLDMAN, supra note 25, at 29-30.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. The interpretations sometimes contrast starkly. See infra Part I.B.1.
38. GOLDMAN, supra note 25, at 29-30.
39. Id. at 31.
40. Lynn M. Fountain, Creating Momentum in Space: Ending the Paralysis
Produced by the "Common Heritage of Mankind" Doctrine, 35 CONN. L. REV. 1753,
1761 (2003); Twibell, supra note 20, at 592; see also GOLDMAN, supra note 25, at 70.
41. See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, at Signatory List (available online at
http://www.state.gov/t/ac/trt/5181.htm).
42. For a more detailed discussion on these treaties see infra Part I.B.2.
43. For a more detailed discussion on the Moon Treaty see infra Part I.B.3. The
2008]
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these treaties has shaped the actions of all nations in outer
space.
1. The Outer Space Treaty
The Outer Space Treaty was the first attempt to regulate
outer space and establish broad guidelines for space
exploration." The treaty recognized "the common interest of all
mankind in the progress of the exploration and use of outer
space for peaceful purposes."45 Although the treaty's seventeen
articles cover a range of issues, they essentially regulate the
use, occupation, and appropriation of space.46 The treaty's
primary purpose was to preclude any claims of sovereignty in
outer space and on celestial bodies.47
Because of the differing interpretations of the Outer Space
Treaty," the "common heritage" language has been interpreted
in two glaringly different ways. 9 For non-space actors, the
language is typically interpreted to mean that outer space, all
its resources, and any benefits derived there from should be
equitably distributed." For space actors, the phrase merely
speaks to the optimism inherent in space exploration and places
no limitations on them whatsoever.5'
Moon Treaty has been ratified and signed by seven nations. Although this is
sufficient to make the Moon Treaty valid law, it is only binding against its
signatories. Twibell, supra note 20, at 597.
44. Eric Husby, Sovereignty and Property Rights in Outer Space, 3 J. INT'L L. &
PRAC. 359, 362 (1994). Both the United States and the Soviet Union claim original
parentage of the Outer Space Treaty. The Soviet Union regards it as a late
acceptance of a 1958 proposal for an international treaty guaranteeing peace and
cooperation in space. The United States regards it as an expansion of President
Johnson's 1966 proposal on a treaty governing exploration of the moon. Id. at n.8
(citing H.G. Darwin, The Outer Space Treaty, 42 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 278 (1967)).
45. Id. (quoting the Outer Space Treaty at 2411).
46. Julie A. Jiru, Star Wars and Space Malls: When the Paint Chips off a
Treaty's Golden Handcuffs, 42 S. TEX. L. REV. 155, 166 (2000).
47. Husby, supra note 44, at 361-62.
48. See GOLDMAN, supra note 25, at 29-30 (discussing the often conflicting on-
the-record interpretations). See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
49. See Fountain, supra note 40, at 1762.
50. Id.
51. Husby, supra note 44, at 364. When the Outer Space Treaty was ratified,
the Committee on Foreign Relations stated that "nothing in Article I [of the Outer
Space Treaty] diminishes or alters the right of the United States to determine how .
. it shares the benefits and results of its space activities." Id. Similarly, the Soviet
Union interpreted Article I to have "no precise definition" and that any
"participation in the international space arena depended ultimately on their will."
Id.
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A similar disagreement arises with the Outer Space
Treaty's non-appropriation clause. 2  The non-space actors,
again, argue that outer space resources cannot be lawfully
appropriated because they belong to all mankind. 3  This
interpretation acts as a virtual bar to mining outer space
because one would need the permission of all mankind to
proceed. 4 Space actors argue that the non-appropriation clause
refers to the permanent appropriation of celestial bodies by
sovereign nations, not the consumption of resources by private
actors.5 Under the latter understanding, private space actors
would be allowed to mine space minerals. 6
2. The Expansionary Treaties
The Rescue Treaty, 7 Space Liability Treaty, 8 and Space
Registration Treaty59  each expanded on the substantive
provisions of the Outer Space Treaty. The Rescue Treaty
expands upon Article V of the Outer Space Treaty and satisfies
"concerns of international cooperation and humanity" by
creating procedures for returning both astronauts and space
objects to their sovereign nation.' The Space Liability Treaty
provided a more detailed framework, ameliorating the concerns
of non-space actors who feared bearing the cost of a space
accident over its territory when it was not posing the same risk
to space actors." The Space Registration Treaty formalized who
and what must be registered with the United Nations.62 In
52. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, at art. II.
53. Fountain, supra note 40, at 1762-63.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. The Agreement on the Rescue of Astronauts, the Return of Astronauts and
the Return of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Apr. 22, 1968, 19 U.S.T. 7570
[hereinafter Rescue Treaty].
58. Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects,
Mar. 29, 1972, 24 U.S.T. 2389 [hereinafter Space Liability Treaty].
59. Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space, Jan. 14,
1975, 28 U.S.T. 695 [hereinafter Space Registration Treaty].
60. GOLDMAN, supra note 25, at 76-77.
61. Id. at 79. Article VI of the Space Liability Treaty makes damage from
space accidents strict liability unless the accident "resulted either wholly or partially
from gross negligence or [the] intent to cause damage on the part of a claimant State
or of natural juridical persons it presents." Space Liability Treaty, supra note 58, at
art. VI. Therefore, absent malfeasance on the part of a state, it is absolutely
protected from bearing the cost of a space accident by another nation.
62. GOLDMAN, supra note 25, at 83. The Space Registration Treaty requires
2008]
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expanding upon Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty,63 the
Space Registration Treaty assists in assessing liability and the
eventual cleanup of space debris by identifying ownership.'
Each of the expansionary treaties expanded upon a general
principle of the Outer Space Treaty to give it a more substantive
and workable form as an enforceable body law.65 It was a
natural expectation that Article V of the Outer Space Treaty
which required nations to render astronauts "all possible
assistance in the event of an accident," would have to be
expanded into a more detailed treaty.66 As such, each of the
treaties was ratified between 1968 and 1975.7
3. The Failed Moon Treaty
The Moon Treaty sought to expand upon the substantive
provisions of the Outer Space Treaty that restricted the
appropriation of outer space and celestial bodies.6" The treaty
aimed too high, however, and was never ratified by any space
actor.69 Although the Moon Treaty is valid law, it is in effect
only against its signatories and is therefore not considered a
part of space law by American commentators."
The Moon Treaty's primary goal was to unambiguously
deny property rights in outer space to both sovereign nations
that the name of the launching state, the space vehicle, the date and location of
launch, the orbital parameters, and the purpose of the space object be registered.
Space Registration Treaty, supra note 59.
63. While the Outer Space Treaty does not expressly require the registration of
space objects, it protects ownership of space objects to the state in which the object is
registered. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, at art. VIII.
64. GOLDMAN, supra note 25, at 83.
65. See GOLDMAN, supra note 25, at 76-77, 79, 83; Outer Space Treaty, supra
note 7, at art. VIII.
66. Cf. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, at art. V and Rescue Treaty, supra
note 57.
67. The Rescue Treaty went into force in 1968 and now has eighty-nine
ratifications, the Space Liability Treaty in 1972 and now has eighty-four
ratifications, and the Space Registration Treaty in 1975 and now has forty-seven
ratifications. United Nations Office for Outer Space Affairs, United Nations
Treaties and Principles on Space Law, http://www.unoosa.org/oosa/en/SpaceLaw/
treaties.html (last visited on Mar. 20, 2008).
68. The Agreement Governing the Activities of the States on the Moon and
other Celestial Bodies, opened for signature Dec. 18, 1979, G.A. Res.34/68, 34 U.N.
GAOR Supp. No. 46 at 77, U.N. Doc. A34146 [hereinafter Moon Treaty].
69. GOLDMAN, supra note 25, at 87; see also supra note 43 and accompanying
text.
70. Twibell, supra note 20, at 597; see also supra note 43 and accompanying
[Vol. 17:2
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and private actors." The drafters of the Moon Treaty saw the
inevitable exploitation of space and introduced the "common
heritage of mankind" doctrine to ensure that the benefits of
space would be shared equally amongst mankind." Under the
plainest reading, this would go so far as to threaten intellectual
property discovered in space." Proponents of the Moon Treaty
claim that it is simply an extension of the Outer Space Treaty,
while opponents claim that it further restricts valuable rights.74
The latter interpretation appears to be the dominant one, not
only because it is universally held amongst the space actors, but
because the Moon Treaty does abrogate many of the "on-the-
record" interpretations the Outer Space Treaty allowed.75
C. HISTORICAL ANTECEDENTS TO SPACE LAW
The language of the Outer Space Treaty and the treaties
that followed borrowed heavily from other treaties already in
existence. Much of the substantive language was adapted from
terrestrial treaties that faced similar obstacles to those
presented by space.76 The international community drew on
their experiences regulating other international commons,
international waters, and terrestrial treaties that had acquired
space provisions.77
Many of the goals of space law are mirrored in the Antarctic
Treaty System, a series of treaties that holistically protect
Antarctica and suspend sovereign claims over the continent.
71. Twibell, supra note 20, at 598-99. See generally Moon Treaty, supra note
68, at art. 4 (requiring that the use of the moon "shall be carried out for the benefit.
. of all countries, irrespective of their degree of economic or scientific
development.").
72. Twibell, supra note 20, at 597-600. See generally Moon Treaty, supra note
68, at arts. 1, 11.
73. Twibell, supra note 20, at 598.
74. Husby, supra note 44, at 368-70.
75. See supra Part I.A. (discussing the "on-the-record" interpretations more
fully).
76. See Husby, supra note 44, at 362 (discussing the adaptation of the Antarctic
Treaty and the Test Ban Treaty to create the Outer Space Treaty's substantive
provisions and formal clauses, respectively).
77. E.g., The Treaty Banning Nuclear Weapon Tests in the Atmosphere, in
Outer Space and Under Water, Aug. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1313, 480 U.N.T.S. 43
[hereinafter Test Ban Treaty]. The Test Ban Treaty prohibited the testing of
nuclear weapons in outer space.
78. The Antarctic Treaty System is comprised of the Antarctic Treaty, 12 UST
794 (1959); the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora,
17 UST 996 (1964); the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals, 29 UST
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The Treaty System preserves Antarctica for scientific study,7 9
protects the environment,"0 and provides guidelines for dealing
with mineral rights."' Although the Treaty System has been a
success in preserving Antarctica while encouraging its use for
scientific discovery, the Treaty System has discouraged all
mining on the continent.82
Space law also borrowed from various treaties governing
the high seas, which have been treated as an international
commons, open to all nations for travel and trade.83 Cooperation
upon the high seas was achieved primarily due to the great
difficulty in defending and occupying a stretch of sea.' If it is
impracticable for a nation to defend territory as their own, they
are better off defending the right for all nations to use it freely. 5
The vacuum of space, which is far too vast to ever be occupied, is
likewise best defended as communal property.
The main treaty controlling international waters is the
Convention on the High Seas. 6 The Convention advocates free
use of the high seas with "reasonable regard to the interests of
other States in their exercise of the freedom of the high seas."87
Free use extends well beyond navigation and allows
consumption of resources in international waters.8 The Outer
441 (1972); and the Convention and Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living
Resources, 33 UST 3476 (1980). Rosanna Sattler, Transporting a Legal System for
Property Rights: From the Earth to the Stars, 6 CHI. J. INT'L L. 23, 32 n.50 (2005).
The Antarctic Treaty System also suspends claims of ownership of Antarctica made
by several nations. Id. at 33. See also Jiru, supra note 46, at 162 (noting that seven
nations have made claims that cover 85% of Antarctica).
79. Jiru, supra note 46, at 162.
80. Id.
81. Id. The scope of the Outer Space Treaty is very similar to that of the
Antarctic Treaty System because the former was based upon the latter as a guide.
Twibell, supra note 20, at 595.
82. The Antarctic Treaty System treats Antarctica as a preserve and does not
allow for mining. A proposed treaty, the Antarctic Mineral Convention, would have
allowed mining to occur upon the unanimous consent of all signatories. Jiru, supra
note 46, at 162-63. This treaty is not in force due to a lack of support. Id.
83. Carol R. Buxton, Property in Outer Space: The Common Heritage of
Mankind Principle vs. the "First in Time, First in Right" Rule of Property Law, 69 J.
AIR L. & COM. 689, 694 (2004).
84. Id.
85. Id.
86. Law of the Sea (Convention on the High Seas), Apr. 29, 1958, 13 U.S.T.
2312, 450 U.N.T.S. 82.
87. Id. at art. II. The Convention goes so far as to require coastal nations to
grant land-locked nations free access to the high seas. Id. at art. III.
88. The Convention expressly includes the freedom of fishing, laying submarine
cables and pipelines, flying over the high seas, and any other freedoms recognized by
general principles of international law. Id. at art. II. The only limitation on these
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Space Treaty adopted some of the language of the Convention on
the High Seas for its own provisions." Its definition of free use,
however, has not been interpreted as broadly as the Convention
on the High Seas.'
The Convention was ratified before mining the seabed was
a reality and so failed to address the issue.9' In the late 1960s,
when seabed mining had become feasible, the United Nations
created the International Seabed Authority in response.92 The
Seabed Authority was the first to use the terminology "common
heritage of mankind" in requiring the economic benefits of
seabed mining to be shared "on a non-discriminatory basis for
the benefit of mankind as a whole."93
Much like the Moon Treaty, the United States and other
developed nations refused to agree to the requirements of the
International Seabed Authority which abrogated the rights
granted by the Convention of the High Seas.94 Instead, the
United States created an independent system (via the 2000
"Seabed Act") for regulating seabed exploitation as a temporary
measure until a "widely acceptable Law of the Sea Treaty" was
created.95 The Seabed Act defends its existence by arguing that
any interpretation of "common heritage of mankind" that
requires communal sharing of profits discourages investment.9 6
Because it will take years of development before recovery of
minerals is possible, this act protects and encourages
investments now.97
freedoms is that they be exercised with the interests of other nations in mind. Id.
89. Twibell, supra note 20, at 595.
90. See supra Part I.B. 1.
91. Buxton, supra note 83, at 694.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 695. See Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 pmbl., July
28, 1994, 33 I.L.M. 1309, 1836 U.N.T.S. 3.
94. Buxton, supra note 83, at 695-96. In addition to sharing profits, the
International Seabed Authority required mandatory transfers of technology and
employed a voting structure that gave all nations equal control regardless of their
economic and technological capabilities. Id. Although the Seabed Act came after the
development of space law, and is not therefore an antecedent to space law, it offers
insights into the future of space law.
95. Deep Seabed Hard Mineral Resources Act, 30 U.S.C. § 1401(a)(8) (2000)
[hereinafter Seabed Act]. The Seabed Act is similar to the International Seabed
Authority on many of its substantive provisions, including protections for the
environment, accidents, and available legal actions. See Sattler, supra note 78, at
36-37.
96. See Jiru, supra note 46, at 171 n.39 (citing the reasons the United States
abstained from signing the treaty for the International Seabed Authority).
97. The Act encourages investment by guaranteeing that profits will not be
2008]
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The Seabed Act, like the International Seabed Authority,
requires an actor who wishes to mine the seabed to apply for a
permit." The permit is a twenty-year grant to mine an area of
the seabed of a size determined by the permit holder's
"estimated production requirements."9 If within ten years of
the issuance of the permit the holder has not harvested
commercial quantities of mineral or shown cause, the permit is
terminated.'" In this manner, those who can make valuable use
of a resource are rewarded and those who cannot are forced to
surrender their right.
D. MODERN SPACE LAW AND MODERN SPACE POLICIES
In 2001, the Rumsfeld Commission reported that the United
States was "more dependent on space than any other nation."' '°
It recommended using the nation's space capabilities to support
"domestic, economic, diplomatic and national security
interests."'' 2  In January 2004, President George W. Bush
created a commission to hold public hearings and explore ways
to expand space exploration, discovery, and commercialization
by private entities.' 3  The Presidential Commission
recommended creating a $100 million to $1 billion prize for the
first private actor to place and sustain humans on the moon for
a specified period of time.'" The Presidential Commission also
found that the lack of private property rights in space
threatened to "strangle a nascent space-based industry in its
cradle; no company will invest millions of dollars in developing a
product to which their legal claim is uncertain."'0 5 All of this
garnished for the "common heritage of mankind." See Sattler, supra note 78, at 36.
The very realistic concerns raised by the Act parallel exactly those raised infra Part
III.A.
98. 30 U.S.C. § 1412 (2000).
99. 30 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(2)(E)(ii)(II) (2000).
100. 30 U.S.C. § 1417(b) (2000).
101. Rumsfeld Commission, supra note 4, at 18.
102. Id. at 27.
103. The Commission on Implementation of United States Exploration Policy
[hereinafter Presidential Commission]. Sattler, supra note 78, at 23-24.
104. Sattler, supra note 78, at 24. This prize is inspired by the 2004 Ansari X-
Prize which awarded $10 million to SpaceShipOne for achieving suborbital flight
twice in one week. Id. at 24-25. The X-Prize, now sponsored by Google, is offering
$20 million to the first private actor to land a robot on the moon and complete
various missions. X PRIZE Foundation, Google Lunar X PRIZE,
http://www.googlelunarxprize.org (last visited Mar. 11, 2008).
105. Sattler, supra note 78, at 27.
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culminated in the new United States space policy.' 6 While the
policy purports to uphold the values of the Outer Space Treaty,
its deliberate goals are more in line with the suggestions from
the Rumsfeld and Presidential Commissions. 10
Despite a lack of legal protections, the space industry has
grown dramatically. Since 1996 the commercial space industry
has exceeded revenue from government-funded space activity.
0 8
Virgin Galactic, owned by Richard Branson, has already sold the
first 100 tickets for tourist flights into space at $210,000 per
seat."°9 The first flights are scheduled for launch in 2008 and
Virgin Galactic is prepared to invest another $100 million to
develop this business."0 And yet, the budding space industry
has barely scratched the surface. Through radio astronomy,
scientists have been able to analyze the asteroid belt orbiting
beyond Mars."' The resources in the belt alone have an
estimated value of $100 billion for every person on earth.' 2
II. THE OUTER SPACE TREATY IS INADEQUATE TO
GOVERN SPACE
For better or worse, the Outer Space Treaty is the
cornerstone of space law."3 Any analysis of space policy ought to
critically evaluate the treaty to determine if it is a stable
foundation or if it needs to be cast aside. An analysis of the
Outer Space Treaty reveals that it is too weak to adequately
govern space and therefore needs to be replaced. This section
will demonstrate that the Outer Space Treaty will inevitably
fail: its problems cannot readily be fixed, and it may already be
invalid.
106. 2006 Space Policy, supra note 8.
107. Compare Rumsfeld Commission, supra note 4 (arguing for prohibiting the
use of space by other nations as a defensive tactic), and Presidential Commission,
supra note 103 (encouraging the use of outer space for commercial activities), with
Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7 (idealizing the use of outer space as an activity for
the benefit of all mankind).
108. Park, supra note 7, at 879.
109. Id. at 25.
110. Id.
111. Lawrence L. Risley, An Examination of the Need to Amend Space Law to
Protect the Private Explorer in Outer Space, 26 W. ST. U. L. REV. 47, 65 (1998-1999).
112. Id.
113. Twibell, supra note 20, at 592.
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A. THE OUTER SPACE TREATY IS DESTINED TO FAIL
The drafters of the Outer Space Treaty designated space as
a commons, allowing any nation to use space without hindrance
but forbidding all nations from claiming any of it as sovereign
territory. "4 The natural fear with any commons is that it will
lead to overuse."5 To combat this, the "benefit of all mankind"
language has been interpreted to require sharing of profits." 6
This interpretation, however, created an anti-commons problem
where outer space is dramatically underused."7
Some commentators argue that absent the Outer Space
Treaty the moon would have been colonized before the end of the
Cold War."'8 If presence in space was continuous, then certain
renewable resources of space would be more easily harnessed.
The natural vacuum and absence of gravity in space aid in
manufacturing semiconductors, microchips, pharmaceuticals,
and aids crystal formation necessary in genetic engineering and
molecular electronics."9 Although technology has advanced on
earth, the natural vacuum of space is still many times superior
to that of our best terrestrial efforts. 2 ° Equally renewable is
solar power which is approximately fifteen times more efficient
when captured in space than on earth. 2 ' The cost to launch
satellites capable of beaming solar energy is prohibitive,'2 2 but
114. Husby, supra note 44, at 365.
115. Garret Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, SCIENCE, Dec. 13, 1968, at
1244. The quintessential commons is a pasture shared by many herders. Each
herder has incentive to graze as many cattle as possible because the degradation of
the pasture is born equally by all herders. In time, the pasture is worthless to all
because each actor over used its resources. For outer space, the fear is that the
economical resources will be consumed by the earliest actors, leaving nothing for
later actors.
116. See supra Part I.B.1.
117. Michael Heller, The Tragedy of the Anti-Commons, 111 HARV. L. REV. 622,
624 (1998). An anti-commons, like a commons, is shared by many actors. Unlike a
commons, rather than each actor having free use of the commons, an actor is
required to gain the consent of all other actors before he can use the common area.
The result is that transaction costs are so great that the common area is
underutilized.
118. Brandon C. Gruner, A New Hope for International Space Law, 35 SETON
HALL L. REV. 299, 318 (2004).
119. Twibell, supra note 20, at 626-27.
120. Id.
121. Rashmi Mayur, Ph.D., Solar Power Satellite and Third World Energy
Future in SPACE MANUFACTURING 7: SPACE RESOURCES TO IMPROVE LIFE ON EARTH
159 (Barbara Faughnan & Gregg Maryniak eds., Nov. 1991). An average solar
power satellite could provide 10 million kilowatts of power, or enough to power a
metropolitan area of four million people. Id.
122. Twibell, supra note 20, at 634.
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would not be if the satellites were created from materials mined
in space.
23
The ostensible goal of the Outer Space Treaty was to
encourage the exploration of outer space "for the benefit of all
peoples."'24  On this it was an abysmal failure.2 5  In place of
granting space to all mankind, the treaty restricted space from
all mankind and stunted space exploration.2 6  Because the
treaty does not deliver its promised benefits, and because the
fears that premised its creation are gone, 27 the treaty will
eventually be rejected.
B. THE PROBLEMS INHERENT IN THE OUTER SPACE TREATY
CANNOT BE REMEDIED
Because the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty created
ambiguities within the text that have been interpreted in
various ways by various actors, 28 there is no consensus on what
the Outer Space Treaty mandates. A division is typically drawn
between space actors and non-space actors. 9 The scope of the
treaty has been flawed since its inception, its weakness has
made it irrelevant in modern space policies, and the treaty itself
appears to be on the cusp of failure.
1. The Treaty's Wide Breadth has Undermined its Strength
The Outer Space Treaty allocates the entire universe to
123. See id. A solar power satellite would have a mass of 100,000 tons.
Therefore, the costs of launching such a satellite would make it economically
prohibitive for the foreseeable future. Id. (citing Gerard K. O'Neill, Keynote
Address, in 68 PROCEEDINGS OF THE FOURTH ANNUAL L5 SPACE DEVELOPMENT
CONFERENCE 18 (Frank Hecker ed., 1987)).
124. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, at 4. One commentator described the
spirit of the Outer Space Treaty as one of the "first real attempts" to establish a
global community that would ensure space would not be divided up "through
conquest and colonialism." Heidi Keefe, Making the Final Frontier Feasible: A
Critical Look at the Current Body of Outer Space Law, 11 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER &
HIGH TECH. L.J. 345-46 (1995).
125. John Hickman, Still Crazy After Four Decades: The Case for Withdrawing
from the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, SPACE REVIEW, Sept. 24, 2007,
http://thespacereview.com/article/960/1.
126. "Within two years of the treaty's ratification, NASA's funding dropped 26%;
four years later, financial support decreased by 45%; and funding for the space
program was down 60% within six years." Gruner, supra note 118, at 315.
127. For a more detailed analysis of the Outer Space Treaty and Cold War fears,
see supra Part I.A.
128. For a more detailed examination of these consequences, see supra Part I.A.
129. See supra note 128.
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mankind.'3 ° No matter how far an actor travels, nothing in
outer space can ever be discovered or claimed. In addition to
covering all of space, most commentators agree that the non-
appropriation clause is intended to apply to state and private
actors alike. 3 ' There is less of a consensus on whether the non-
appropriation clause is limited to celestial bodies or if it extends
to minerals as well.'32 The debate extends back to the original
on-the-record interpretations in which the space actors
interpreted Article I of the Outer Space Treaty as
meaningless.'33
When the Outer Space Treaty was drafted the dominant
view was that it barred all property rights, including those of
private actors and patents.'34 That view has lost support over
time as the changing international environment recognized the
necessity to allow some property rights in space.'35 Regardless,
the damage was done. The fact that property rights could
dramatically change without the treaty text changing indicated
one thing: uncertainty. Uncertainty is anathema to investment.
The Outer Space Treaty claims to apply to all actors
through all of space.'36 Over time, however, the definitions of
both actor and space have come under flux.'37 During this time,
130. See generally Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7 (referring to outer space
generally, making no limitation on where its application ends). To give this context,
Voyager 1 was launched in 1977 and has traveled 100 times the distance from the
Earth to the sun. Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology,
Voyager 1: 'The Spacecraft That Could' Hits New Milestone (Aug. 15, 2006),
http://www.jpl.nasa.gov/news/features.cfm?feature=1 150.
131. Article II of the Outer Space Treaty bans "national appropriation by claim
of sovereignty, by means of use or occupation, or by any other means." See Outer
Space Treaty, supra note 7. It is the "any other means" language that was
interpreted to keep states from appropriating celestial bodies through private actors
acting on their behalf. Jonathan Thomas, Privatization of Space Ventures:
Proposing a Proven Regulatory Theory for Future Extraterrestrial Appropriation, 1
INT'L L. & MGMT. REV. 191, 199-200 (2005). Cf. Sattler, supra note 78, at 28-29
(arguing that there is disagreement on whether the Outer Space Treaty prohibits
property rights of private actors).
132. Sattler, supra note 78, at 28-29.
133. The "on-the-record" interpretations are discussed more fully in supra Part
I.A.
134. Glenn H. Reynolds, International Space Law: Into the Twenty-First
Century, 25 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 225, 230 (1992).
135. Id. Although the current dominant view is to allow some property rights in
space, the lack of a clear set of laws is still a barrier to most actors. What rights are
protected and what are not is still in debate and in flux.
136. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7. See supra notes 130-133 and
accompanying text.
137. See supra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
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domestic courts have been reluctant to make statements
regarding outer space.' Although courts have been willing to
extend jurisdiction of United States patent law to cover
infringement aboard "American vessels on the high seas,"'39 they
have been unwilling to extend that same principle to United
States vessels in outer space.14° Although the comparison is
strikingly clear, courts have stated that they are awaiting a
clear signal from Congress regarding extraterritorial
applications of patent law.' Moreover, international courts
have never enforced Article I against any nation.'42 The lack of
faith in the Outer Space Treaty is as great as its purported
breadth, making it an insufficient base to develop a substantive
set of space laws.
2. The Outer Space Treaty is Irrelevant to Modern Space
Policies
In the four decades since the creation of the Outer Space
Treaty, society has been guided by more corporate incentives
than governmental mandates.'43 Exploration of outer space is
prohibitively expensive,'" requiring certainty and stability to
encourage investment.'45 Because space actors have relied on
differing interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty depending on
their interests,'46 there now exists decades of space policy that
would have to be changed if the treaty was to regain relevance.
This is likely too high a hurdle to cross.
In 2006 the United States updated its space policy for the
138. Twibell, supra note 20, at 617-18.
139. Gardiner v. Howe, 9 F. Cas. 1157 (C.C.D.Mass. 1865).
140. Twibell, supra note 20, at 617-18.
141. Ocean Science & Eng'g, Inc. v. United States, 595 F.2d 572 (Ct. Cl. 1979).
142. Husby, supra note 44, at 364.
143. Thomas, supra note 131, at 206.
144. It is estimated that by 2010 the United States alone will have invested
$600 billion in space, comparable to the total current U.S. investment in Europe.
See Park, supra note 7, at 879. The 2006 Space Policy also acknowledges that space
technology requires lengthy research and development time. Therefore, the policy
seeks to promote research to "ensure that space capabilities are available in time to
further U.S. national security, homeland security, and foreign policy objectives ... 
2006 Space Policy, supra note 8.
145. Jiru, supra note 46, at 171. Although this section primarily focuses on the
need to provide stability for private actors, it is worth noting that state actors act
similarly. As mentioned in note 126, supra, the United States' investment in space
dropped dramatically once the risk of the Soviet Union was removed.
146. For a more detailed discussion of these interpretations see supra Part I.A.
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first time in more than a decade.'47 The 2006 Space Policy
brought many of the modern assumptions about the Outer
Space Treaty under the official auspices of national policy."
The policy also showcased the United States' continued
departure from the idealistic intentions originally embodied in
the Outer Space Treaty.'49  In interpreting the "peaceful
purposes" language of Article IV,'5 the United States mandated
as one of its core principles to "take those actions necessary to
protect [the United States'] space capabilities; . . .and deny, if
necessary, adversaries the use of space capabilities hostile to
U.S. national interests."'' The 2006 Space Policy also addresses
the goal of "[dlevelop[ing] and deploy[ing] space capabilities that
sustain U.S. advantage."'52
The United States justified its 2006 Space Policy on
grounds that space has become a critical component of its
economy'53 and national security.'54 The United Nations Charter
recognizes that self-defense is an inherent right of all states.'55
It is undisputed that a critical component of United States self-
147. See 2006 Space Policy, supra note 8. The space policy supersedes the
Presidential Decision Directive/NSC-49/NSTC-8, National Space Policy, dated Sept.
14, 1996.
148. The 2006 Space Policy acknowledges the right to weaponize space to defend
space capabilities, the right to privately benefit from space, and seeks to foster a
commercialized space sector. Id. In doing so, the 2006 Space Policy abrogates any
reading of the Outer Space Treaty that restricts all property rights, demands
equitable distribution of the benefits of space, and prohibits the weaponization of
space under any pretense.
149. Id.
150. Article IV of the Outer Space Treaty says in pertinent part: "The moon and
other celestial bodies shall be used by all States Parties to the Treaty exclusively for
peaceful purposes .... [The testing of any type of weapons .. .on celestial bodies
shall be forbidden." See Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7.
151. 2006 Space Policy, supra note 8. The Space Policy goes on to state that any
"proposed arms control agreements must not impair the rights of the United States
to conduct research, development, testing, and operations or other activities in space
for U.S. national interests." A natural reading of the Space Policy shows the United
States reserving the right to weaponize space if doing so is consistent with U.S.
national interests. Given that one of the national interests the U.S. asserts is being
able to defend its own interests in space, a circular argument exists that endows the
U.S. with the ability to weaponize space as a precaution for space being weaponized.
See infra note 167 and accompanying text.
152. 2006 Space Policy, supra note 8.
153. See supra note 16 and accompanying text.
154. 2006 Space Policy, supra note 8. The 2006 Space Policy states that the
United States "is critically dependent upon space capabilities, and this dependence
will grow." Id.
155. U.N. Charter art. 51.
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defense is dependent on "space force enhancements."' 56  The
United States has interpreted self-defense as including not only
defense of a nation's people, but defense of a nation's property.'57
Under the 2006 Space Policy, a threat on United States' space
assets could justifiably result in the weaponization of space.'58 It
seems improbable that a policy with the stated goals of
sustaining an advantage in space and "denying similar
capabilities to others" is compatible with the Outer Space
Treaty and reserving space for the benefit of all peoples.'59
3. The Outer Space Treaty is on the Cusp of Failing
The increasing dependence on space for self-defense has
naturally brought the fear of weaponization of space to the
forefront of the debate.'6 °  The modern understanding of
"peaceful" is "non-aggressive," as permitted under Article 2(4) of
the United Nations Charter.'6 ' Consequently, space has already
been weaponized in so much as it is crucial to the military
156. See Park, supra note 7, at 892 (noting that without "space force
enhancements" the U.S. military power would be crippled). The phrase "space force
enhancements" refer to satellites which provide communications, reconnaissance,
navigation, and missile launch warning. See id. at 895 ("[T]he United States is more
dependent on space technology for its security and economic well-being than any
other nation.") (citing Report of The Commission to Assess United States National
Security Space Management and Organization: S. Hrg. 18 Before the Subcomm. on
Strategic Forces of the S. Comm. on Armed Services 117th Cong. 154 (2001)).
157. See Park, supra note 7, at 893-96 (citing the increased use of the United
States on the self-defense argument to justify its stance, on the defensive
weaponization of outer space). While this section refers only to the United States,
many other nations rely heavily on outer space for military, communications, and
economics as well. The United States, however, acts as a useful litmus test because
its participation in a treaty often signals its success or failure.
158. The argument logically follows from three premises: an inherent right to
self-defense, see supra note 155 and accompanying text; an understanding of self-
defense as including property of private actors sovereign to the nation, see supra
note 157 and accompanying text; and, finally, an understanding that the right to
self-defense includes a right to preventative action, see supra note 151 and
accompanying text.
159. Compare 2006 Space Policy, supra note 8 (arguing for precluding other
nations from space), with Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7 (arguing that outer
space is for the benefit of all mankind).
160. See generally Park, supra note 7, at 881.
161. Id. at 883-84. The United States was the first to propose that outer space
be used exclusively for peaceful purposes. President Dwight D. Eisenhower and
U.N. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge, 36 Dep't of State Bulletin 124, 227 (1957).
However, the United States was also the first to point out that the term peaceful
allows for "non-aggressive" space militarization. See Park, supra note 7, at 884
(citing ABRAM CHAYES ET AL., SPACE WEAPONS: THE LEGAL CONTEXT, IN WEAPONS IN
SPACE 193, 196-97 (Franklin A. Long et al. eds., 1986)).
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operations of all developed nations. 62 As the United States
moves forward with its 2006 Space Policy, space will be further
weaponized, not only by military satellites, but by destructive
weapons, leaving other countries no choice but to follow in
step. 163
While no state wants to be the first to openly weaponize
space, many are investing in dual-use technology." Dual-use
technologies are weapons designed for defensive action, and
therefore considered "peaceful," but retain potent offensive
capabilities. 65 Because there is no current bar against dual-use
weapons, their placement in orbit will have the effect of
weaponizing space. 66
The weaponization of space is inevitable because it is in
every nation's best interest to weaponize space. This scenario is
a classic prisoner's dilemma.167 No matter what action is taken
by other nations, every single nation is enticed by the benefit of
being the first to weaponize space. 6  Although non-armament
treaties can rectify the situation somewhat,'69 they are not a
long-term solution because the incentive to defect will always
remain.7 °  Finally, the 2006 Space Policy also expressly
162. See supra notes 156-157.
163. See Park, supra note 7, at 898-900.
164. Similar to during the Cold War, all nations fear that whoever is the first to
weaponize space will turn public opinion against them. See supra Part I.A.
165. Park, supra note 7, at 884-85 (noting the most prominent dual-use weapon
is space based lasers designed to destroy hostile ballistic missiles, but capable of
targeting defensive and non-hostile objects).
166. As argued above, any argument that space is not already weaponized is
purely academic. It is crucial to all manner of modern warfare, both offensive and
defensive, and terrestrial missile systems have been developed to target space
satellites. See supra notes 12 & 156-157 and accompanying text. Space is not
peaceful, but placement of dual-use weapons will make it decidedly less peaceful.
167. In a Prisoner's Dilemma scenario the optimal result is obtained when both
sides cooperate. However, there is an incentive for each side to defect. When both
sides defect, the worst scenario is obtained. Although defection harms each actor,
the rational action is to defect because no matter the other actor does, you are
better-off by defection. Robert Aumann, Acceptable points in general cooperative n-
person games, in 4 CONTRIBUTIONS TO THE THEORY OF GAMES, ANNALS OF
MATHEMATICS STUDY 40, pp. 287-324 (R. D. Luce & A. W. Tucker, eds. 1959).
168. In the case of weaponizing space, each side is best served if no one
weaponizes space. But a nation has an incentive to defect and weaponize space to
become the dominant space actor. When both sides inevitably defect, the result is a
space war where all actors lose. Id.
169. In a Prisoner's Dilemma scenario a treaty is a called a reciprocity
constraint. It requires both actors to take the same action. Id.
170. The incentive to defect will never dissipate and once any actor defects all
actors must follow. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. Similarly, given the
number of space actors, it is unlikely that all will agree to be bound by a single
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prohibits agreeing to arms control restrictions that impair
United States objectives."'
Given the inevitability of the weaponization of space,' it
behooves every nation to weaponize as soon as possible to "stay
ahead of the curve."'73  Even if a nation chooses not to
aggressively restrict other nations from weaponizing space, it
would be ensuring it could not be similarly exploited.'74 It is also
in the best interests of every nation for a measured introduction
of weapons to space by opposing nations at approximately the
same time. The alternative would be a sudden discovery that
one nation had secretly weaponized space.'75 The former is
likely to create an international tension while the later is likely
to spark a new Cold War.'76
Any interpretation of the Outer Space Treaty that attempts
to bind the hands of the United States to keep weapons out of
space will be rejected as harshly as the Moon Treaty.'77
Coupling this weakness with the absence of an international
court to adjudicate conflicts means that the first time the Outer
Space Treaty is tested, it will become apparent that it has no
teeth.'78 Although this is problematic because countries could
simply refuse to cooperate in settling conflicts, the absence of
procedure is even more worrisome.'79 With no agreed upon
procedure, discovery alone could grind proceedings to a halt as
treaty.
171. 2006 Space Policy, supra note 8.
172. There is a strong rebuttal to the inevitability argument that weaponization
of space is only inevitable because nations consider it inevitable. Nations have made
it a self-fulfilling prophecy out of fear. While the point is noted, given the current
hostilities in the world, the failing of similar treaties such as the Nuclear
Proliferation Treaty, and the fact that only one nation need weaponize space for it to
be weaponized, the inevitability argument is the probable outcome. See Park, supra
note 7, at 888-89.
173. Id. at 886.
174. See id. at 890 (citing that the United States may weaponize space purely as
a security measure to protect their dependence on space).
175. Such an event would be very reminiscent of the launch of Sputnik that
triggered the space race. In the aftermath of Sputnik, the world community rushed
to ease its collective fears by adopting a body of space law that proved ill suited to its
actual needs. While Sputnik proved to be rather benign, a similar mistake with
something as volatile as the weaponization of space could trigger a new Cold War or
worse. See supra Part I.A.
176. The Rumsfeld Commission, supra note 4, at viii, warned of a "Space Pearl
Harbor" if the United States did not prepare to defend its space assets.
177. The rejection of the Moon Treaty is discussed more fully supra Part I.B.3.
178. Jason Haile, The New Age of Conquest and Colonialism: How Admirality
Will be Used on the Final Frontier, 29 TUL. MAR. L.J. 353, 360 (2005).
179. Id.
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each nation attempts to use its own rules of dispositions,
service, production of documents, etc.' ° The Outer Space Treaty
is propped up on so little that it should be examined before
further action destroys its already eroding foundation.
C. THE OUTER SPACE TREATY MAY ALREADY BE INVALID
While the Outer Space Treaty allows signatories to
withdraw on one year's notice,'"' the Treaty itself may actually
be invalid under the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.'82 The Treaty Convention recognizes that states ought
not to be held by a treaty when there has been a fundamental
change in circumstances.' 3 A fundamental change is defined as
a shift in an expectation closely linked to the purpose of the
treaty that was not foreseen by the parties." While
international tribunals have been strict in finding a
fundamental change of circumstances,' 5 the Outer Space Treaty
would likely be found to have undergone a fundamental change
because of the circumstances surrounding its creation,'8 6 the
changes in its interpretation,'87 and because the usage of outer
space today is a far cry from what was planned for in the
1960s.'88 '"hile ... space activities have grown exponentially,"
space law has remained stagnant.' 9
III. DERIVING PRINCIPLES FOR A STRONGER SPACE
LAW
The principles of "Qui prior est tempore potior est jure"'9
180. Id.
181. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, art. XVI.
182. Thomas, supra note 131, at 213. See generally Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, art. 31, 1195 U.N.T.S. 331, 8
I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Treaty Convention].
183. Treaty Convention, supra note 182, art. 62.
184. Id.
185. Thomas, supra note 131, at 213-14 (discussing the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros
Project where despite environmental concerns and diminishing economic viability a
treaty was held to be valid).
186. The circumstances surrounding the creation of the Outer Space Treaty are
described more fully supra Part I.B.
187. The changes in interpretation of space law is discussed more fully in supra
Part II.B.1.
188. Haile, supra note 178, at 358.
189. Id.
190. "Who is first in point of time is stronger in right." Thomas, supra note 131,
at 220.
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have been a guiding tenet of property law for thousands of
years. 9 ' While some commentators argue that this model is the
best for encouraging space exploration,'9 2 it does not satisfy the
longstanding fears of non-space actors that space will be
entirely appropriated before they ever leave Earth.'93 While the
international community has dealt with "commons" problems
before, outer space presents a commons that is virtually
inaccessible to a majority of the world while offering great
rewards to an elite few.'94 An examination of these treaties
reveals not only their strengths and weaknesses, but why they
succeeded or failed. The result is a list of principles that an
effective space law must have. They are (a) wide international
acceptance; (b) incentives for state and private actors to use
outer space; and, (c) flexibility to adapt to changes in the
international community.
A. WIDE INTERNATIONAL ACCEPTANCE
Treaties have only gained wide international acceptance
when the benefits they offered were universally desirable.'9 5
Every treaty examined in this Note that placed greater
obligations on an actor than benefits conferred was rejected.'96
While the simple answer is for space law to limit its restrictive
provisions to aspects that harm all nations equally,'97 nations
191. Id.
192. Id. at 220-22.
193. For a more detailed discussion on these fears see supra Part I.A.
194. For a more detailed discussion on the rewards of outer space see supra Part
I.D.
195. The Outer Space Treaty ameliorated fears born by every nation. Cf supra
Part I.A. (detailing the international climate at the creation of the Outer Space
Treaty and Cold War fears). The expansionary treaties offered benefits exactly
reciprocal to the obligations they imposed. See supra Part I.B.2. The Convention on
the High Seas ensured that every nation would have access to the high seas without
having to defend its right. See supra Part I.C.
196. The Moon Treaty was heavily rejected because it offered little to no
protection to space actors. See supra Part I.B.3. The International Seabed
Authority was rejected by developed nations who did not want to abrogate their
rights to mine the seabed. See supra Part I.C. The Antarctic Treaty System's efforts
to regulate Antarctic mining fared similarly. See supra note 82.
197. Nations have typically regarded harm to the environment, waste of
resources, and impediments to their own lawful use as valid reciprocal harms. See
supra Part I.C. In addition, nations have viewed rescue agreements, accident
payment provisions, and subjection to an independent tribunal as reciprocal
benefits. Consider supra Part I.B.2. The United States has frequently refused to
subject itself to the jurisdiction or other tribunals. The United States acknowledges
the World Court as a purely advisory body and in 2002 withdrew itself as a
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have been willing to surrender rights for social or political
benefits. For example, in October 2007 the United States
Senate Foreign Relations Committee opened debate on whether
or not to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea.'98 It was argued that ratifying the Convention would gain
the United States a veto power against future changes.'
Although ratifying the Convention would supersede the Seabed
Act and limit the United States' deep seabed mining privileges,
the veto power would allow the United States to regulate other
provisions of the Convention that limit the U.S. Navy.2°
B. INCENTIVES FOR STATE AND PRIVATE ACTORS
Absolutely crucial to the use of any resource is a motivation
to use it. 2° ' The need for motivation increases along with the
risk and capital needed to harness the resource. 22 Fortunately,
space offers near limitless rewards for those who can harness it
as a resource. 203 Space law must therefore readily encourage the
use of space if these laws are to be successful.
The Convention on the High Seas allowed for any nation to
use international waters, but also allowed nations to claim
sovereignty over islands found in those waters.2°  In this
manner it encouraged the use of the high seas not only for travel
and trade, but also for exploration. As entrepreneurs attempted
to make better use of the seas they made incidental discoveries
signatory from the 1998 Rome Statute to establish an International Criminal Court
which would subject U.S. soldiers to its jurisdiction. The Bush Administration went
so far as to promote passage of the American Servicemen's Protection Act (ASPA),
which prohibits U.S. cooperation with the Court and even restricts U.S. military aid
to countries that refuse to sign an agreement pledging to shield U.S. troops on their
territory from ICC prosecution. The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea,
Hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relation, 110th Cong., 1st Sess.
(Oct. 4, 2007) (opening statement of Senator Richard G. Lugar), available at
http://www.senate.gov/-foreigntestimony/2007LugarStatementO7lOO4.pdf.
198. The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Hearing before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relation, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 14, 2003), available at
http://www.senate.gov/-foreign/testimony/2003/LugarStatementO31014.pdf.
199. The U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea, Hearing before the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relation, 108th Cong., 1st Sess. (Oct. 14, 2003) (opening
statement of Senator Richard G. Lugar), available at http://www.senate.gov/-
foreignltestimony/2003[LugarStatement03l0l4.pdf.
200. Id.
201. Twibell, supra note 20, at 616.
202. Id.
203. See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
204. The Convention on the High Seas deals exclusively with the high seas. See
supra Part I.C.
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that benefited all of mankind °.2 5  The more pronounced a
presence there is in space, the more incidental discoveries are
likely to be found. Humanity's short presence in space has
already led to developments in medicine and electronics which
have the potential to help the masses.0 6
The Seabed Act also encourages use of resources while
being less generous than free appropriation. 7  The Act
encourages investment by creating a presumption that a permit
will be allowed so long as a basic showing is made °.2  However,
the Act still allows the government to retain control of when and
where mining occurs. °  More importantly, the Seabed Act
requires permit holders to make commercially viable use of the
mining area or forfeit the permit.2"0 This encourages active use
of resources and alleviates the fears that nations with the most
technological advantage will appropriate all of the economical
resources. The Seabed Act demonstrates that actors only need
incentives, not bribes, to exploit resources. Space law does not
have to offer the light side of the moon to spur actors to act.
The argument should be tempered by noting that the fears
of non-space actors are not completely ameliorated because
space actors actually will develop the most economical
resources, forcing non-space actors to travel farther or develop
less economical resources. This is a flimsy argument. First, no
one advocates never using the resources of outer space.21' The
argument is over the equitable distribution of the benefits. 2
Because an equitable distribution means space will never be
exploited, most commentators ignore this reading of the Outer
Space Treaty.2"3 The only remaining reading would be to
preserve outer space resources until all nations can equitably
exploit them individually and equally. Because it is unlikely
that there will ever be a moment when all nations have an equal
205. Thomas, supra note 131, at 219-22 (citing the discovery of the Americas as
a result of exploration).
206. Twibell, supra note 20, at 626-27.
207. See supra Part I.C.
208. 30 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(2)(D) (2000).
209. The issuing of permits gives the government considerable latitude,
including the ability to deny a permit on grounds that it threatens the environment
(30 U.S.C. § 1413(a)(2)(D)(ii) (2000)), or threatens other lawful uses of the High Seas
by other nations (30 U.S.C. § 1421) (2000).
210. See supra note 100 and accompanying text.
211. The very language of "for the benefit of all peoples" intimates that some
benefit is eventually intended to result. Outer Space Treaty, supra note 7, 4.
212. These arguments are developed more fully in supra Part I.B.
213. Thomas, supra note 131, at 200.
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foothold in outer space, if this latter reading were true, at some
point the international community would have to agree to
dissolve the Outer Space Treaty. Under that interpretation, it
seems that non-space actors are just trying to "buy time" until
they can get into space.
Second, outer space is immense."4 Any fear that the "good
resources" will be used up is circumspect at best. For example,
in 2004 the world production of iron exceeded one-billion metric
tons for the first time ever."5 A typical asteroid one kilometer in
diameter contains two to three times that much iron ore.216
Current estimates place between 1.1 and 1.9 million asteroids of
that size in our solar system.2 7
C. FLEXIBILITY TO ADAPT TO CHANGES IN THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMUNITY
Space exploration has existed for less than fifty years and
so it is presumptuous to assume that the laws created today will
remain useful in the next decade, much less the next century.210
Space law ought to create a framework in which to operate
rather than a stable set of laws. Central to a strong framework
will be a strong governing body to resolve disputes. 2"9 A
governing body can also distribute and review permits on an
equal footing, ensuring that the benefits of space are equitably
distributed to those parties best suited.2 More importantly, by
only issuing permits the regulatory body can shift resources
toward their best and highest use as technology develops and
other actors or uses become more efficient for a segment of
space.221
214. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
215. International Iron and Steel Institute, 2005, World Produces 1.05 Billion
Tonnes of Steel in 2004, NEW MATERIALS INTERNATIONAL, Jan. 19, 2005,
http://www.newmaterials.com/news/833.asp.
216. JOHN S. LEWIS, MINING THE SKY: UNTOLD RICHES FROM THE ASTEROIDS,
COMETS, AND PLANETS (1997).
217. Press Release, European Space Agency, New Study Reveals Twice as Many
Asteroids as Previously Believed (Apr. 4, 2002) http://www.spaceref.comnews/
viewpr.html?pid=7925. See supra note 111 and accompanying text.
218. The Moon Treaty is the quintessential example of a shift in the needs of the
international community. Just twelve years after the wide ratification of the Outer
Space Treaty, the Moon Treaty was even more widely rejected. See supra Part I.B.3.
219. Haile, supra note 178, at 360. Space is an expensive place and the absence
of a regulatory body capable of resolving disputes is a disincentive to invest large
sums of money in outer space. Id.
220. See supra Part III.B.
221. See generally Seabed Act, supra note 95.
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D. A MODERN EXAMPLE IN THE INTERNATIONAL
TELECOMMUNICATIONS UNION
The International Telecommunications Union (ITU) is an
agency of the United Nations that oversees geostationary orbital
slots for satellites.222 Because there are a limited number of
orbital slots they are highly demanded and therefore must be
regulated. The ITU regulates orbital slots under an a priori and
an a posteriori system.223 Under the a posteriori system the
maxim of "first in time, first in right" awards slots as the need
arises and is demonstrated.2 4 Not surprisingly, space actors
prefer this method.22 5 The a priori system awards slots to each
nation, regardless of whether the slots are needed.226 Again,
non-space actors prefer the latter system because it reserves
orbital slots for their eventual entrance to space.227
The ITU requires that the "majority of slots applied for
must be used directly by the countries requesting the slots" due
in part to the sale of orbital slots.228 The Pacific Island nation of
Tonga registered for a number of geostationary orbital slots
with which it leased one and auctioned five more for $2 million
per year for each slot. 29 The ITU has since stated that it will
distribute slots to "those who provide the most efficient use of
the resource," reasoning that to do otherwise would waste
resources.
2 30
Because of its great flexibility in determining who gets
which slot and the ability to alter those decisions as the
situation changes, the ITU has many of the same strengths as
the United States Seabed Act.3  Regrettably, the ITU
222. Geostationary orbit slots refer to the band of space directly above the
equator and are likely "the most valuable of all space resources to date." Buxton,
supra note 83, at 703 (quoting Ezra J. Reinstein, Owning Outer Space, 20 Nw. J.
INT'L L. & BuS. 59, 64 (1999)). Satellites in these slots travel at the same speed as
the earth, allowing the satellite to cover a continuous area on earth. Id. "[A]
satellite in geostationary orbit encompasses a field of view of 42% of the earth's land
surface." Id.
223. Susan Cahill, Give Me My Space: Implications for Permitting National
Appropriation of the Geostationary Orbit, 19 WIS. INT'L L.J. 231, 238 (2001).
224. Buxton, supra note 83, at 703-04.
225. Id.
226. Cahill, supra note 223, at 238.
227. Buxton, supra note 83, at 703-04.
228. Id.
229. Id. Tonga originally applied for 16 orbital slots but reduced this number to
six because of international pressure. Id.
230. Id.
231. See supra Parts I.C. & III.C.
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circumvented perhaps its greatest strength when it stopped the
sale of orbital slots. 23 2 Some commentators suggest the impetus
for the decision was that allowing orbital slots to be sold
reflected an acknowledgement of a space property right.33 In
distributing orbital slots to all nations and then allowing them
to be auctioned, non-space actors would be benefiting from space
while preserving the orbital slot for their eventual entrance to
space.2" The benefits of space would be distributed to all of
mankind as space actors are given incentive and reward for
exploration and non-space actors are paid for access to their
property.
CONCLUSION
The twenty-first century has brought a new set of fears to
the ongoing space race. Fears of national security and economic
turmoil have brought the world's eyes back to outer space as the
hope for the future. The current body of space law still looks to
old fears, and so inadequately addresses the needs of the
international community. As nations continue to test the
boundaries of the Outer Space Treaty, it is becoming ever more
clear that it has little strength to guide or control space actors.
Space is becoming dangerously close to outright weaponization,
and when it does there will be no guides to navigate through the
uncharted dangers. A new body of space law is required; one
that can recognize changes as rapidly as they arise.
Fortunately, the international community can draw upon their
successes in the past to create a dynamic and powerful body of
space law that can react to the needs of the twenty-first century
and beyond.
232. See Buxton, supra note 83, at 703-04.
233. Id.
234. In essence, the ITU could have granted a permit similar to those proposed,
supra Part III.C., allowing a market for space to form naturally. As more and more
nations began using their orbital slots, the demand for orbital slots would rise,
causing a corresponding increase in price, and providing an even greater benefit for
late-arriving space actors.
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